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business rules). A similar position is achieved in Austria and Germany; there a
breach of conduct of business rules directly constitutes a breach of a private law
duty, even though regulatory duties are not ordinarily considered to be of a private
law nature.
The editors also discuss the potential for breach of MiFID rules to indirectly impact
on a bank’s private law liabilities. In Germany, there is increasing academic support
for regulatory duties to inﬂuence the construction of the banks’ contractual duties, and
in the Netherlands the courts frequently specify a bank’s duty of care by reference to
regulatory duties imposed on the bank, particularly conduct of business rules. The
authors also note the potential for a similar baseline in Spain, England and Wales
and Ireland. Whether the law will develop in this direction remains to be seen, but
this volume shows that there is a huge amount going on in this area, and much think-
ing that remains to be done. It is encouraging to see sustained comparative analysis of
the topic that treats each system as its own and seeks, from this range of approaches,
some common threads.
All in all, this books is a fascinating read and is recommended for generalists and
specialists alike. Specialists should look forward, one hopes, to a further edition in
due course.
HELEN MCGRATH
A SOLICITOR OF THE SENIOR COURTS OF ENGLAND AND WALES
Foundations of Indirect Discrimination Law. Edited by HUGH COLLINS and
TARUNABH KHAITAN. [Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2018. x + 292 pp. Hardback
£65.00. ISBN 978-15-09912-54-4.]
Indirect or disparate impact discrimination has become an integral part of discrim-
ination law regimes in many jurisdictions. First established in the landmark case of
Griggs v Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971), the concept has since developed
into a nuanced but often divergent collection of principles. These have become cen-
tral to debates concerning the objectives and legitimacy of discrimination law. In its
most basic form, indirect discrimination involves the prohibition of neutral rules (i.e.
rules which are not directly discriminatory) which nevertheless put some members
of a protected group at a particular disadvantage. From its inception the concept has
been charged with normative and conceptual uncertainty. Commentators have chal-
lenged the legitimacy of holding someone accountable for applying rules that pro-
duce disparate outcomes in situations where there was no discriminatory intent.
They have also questioned the compatibility of indirect discrimination with the ori-
ginal aims of the law of direct discrimination: Smith, Basic Equality and
Discrimination: Reconciling Theory and Law (2011); Alexander, “What Makes
Wrongful Discrimination Wrong? Biases, Preferences, Stereotypes, and Proxies”
(1992) 141 U.Pa.L.Rev. 149; Cavanagh, Against Equality of Opportunity (2002).
Indirect discrimination remains controversial, particularly in the US and the UK.
This collection of essays, edited by Hugh Collins and Tarunabh Khaitan, exam-
ines foundational questions relating to the purpose, legitimacy and conceptual dis-
tinctiveness of the law of indirect discrimination. An edited collection focusing
exclusively on indirect discrimination law is a welcome addition to scholarship
which has primarily dealt with this topic as a part of a wider discussion of the
law of discrimination. While the book as a whole does not present a uniﬁed
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argument in response to any of the questions it addresses, the discussion within is
rich and insightful.
In the opening chapter, Collins and Khaitan present an overview of the “contro-
versies and critical questions” which surround indirect discrimination law. More
than a mere introduction, this chapter seeks to synthesise the themes presented in
the collection (perhaps more perspectives than can be handled elegantly). Collins
and Khaitan characterise indirect discrimination as a “protean concept”, comprised
of divergent moral principles and institutional structures. This verdict reﬂects the
state of the ﬁeld and gives the inexpert reader a helpful introduction to a body of
unstable law.
A central issue addressed in the ensuing chapters is the conceptual distinctiveness
of indirect discrimination. The greatest synergy between authors is here, even if the
contributors seldom engage with each other’s arguments. The discussions by
Fredman, Moreau, Collins and Khaitan and Steel use various methods, allowing
the reader to grasp the doctrinal and philosophical subtleties of the conceptual dis-
tinctiveness question. Consensus forms around the conclusion that the apparently
neat distinction between direct and indirect discrimination is neither neat nor certain.
Fredman presents a clear and thorough account of the doctrinal developments of dis-
crimination law in both the US and the UK, emphasising that jurisdictions “have
found it diﬃcult to draw a bright line distinction” due in part to an aversion to
aﬃrmative action and a continued emphasis on individual fault and harm. This
account is supplemented by the book’s ﬁnal chapter, where Collins sketches a com-
prehensive analysis of the legitimacy of justiﬁcation in indirect discrimination law,
comparing it to the approach in direct discrimination law. He blends doctrine with
theory and oﬀers a ﬁne supplement to Fredman’s analysis of justiﬁcation as a
method of distinguishing between direct and indirect discrimination. The discussion
by Moreau and Khaitan and Steel addresses the conceptual distinctiveness question
more obliquely. However, it grounds the distinctiveness point within the wider the-
oretical arguments that they advance. The result is a collection of chapters which,
when read together, represent a comprehensive and contemporaneous account of
scholarship addressing this question.
The chapters by Hellman, Moreau, Lippert-Rasmussen and Khaitan and Steel are
more philosophical. In debates concerning the theoretical foundations of indirect
discrimination, a central concern is the precise nature of the harm of indirect dis-
crimination and how and whether this may legitimate laws prohibiting such conduct.
These chapters each present a diﬀerent conceptualisation of the harm in question
and ground a justiﬁcation for the prohibition of such harm within that theoretical
framework. They often diverge from one another in key respects, even though
they share common premises and methods. Hellman argues that the harm of indirect
discrimination accrues because it compounds the injustice of direct discrimination.
In contrast, Moreau conceives of the harm as more akin to negligence. Khaitan and
Steel account for two types of harm caused by indirect discrimination; particularised
harm that is felt by individuals and which is contrasted with the harm felt by groups
that those members are a part of. However, they are not entirely clear regarding the
causal connection between these two kinds of harm. At one point they argue that
indirect discrimination harms groups as a whole and that individuals are harmed
because they are members of those groups. However, they later argue that indirect
discrimination harms subsets of groups which consequently produces knock-on
harms to groups as a whole. These claims are mutually incompatible. Harm either
accrues top down or bottom up; it cannot do both. Each of these chapters contains
a distinct theory of indirect discrimination, such that each chapter stands apart from
chapters based on other theories. Although that may disorient some readers,
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Bamforth’s chapter presents a succinct but detailed overview of key theories which
will provide a reader unfamiliar with indirect discrimination, or indeed discrimin-
ation in general, with a window into the many ways that concepts can be understood
and the harms they wish to protect against can be identiﬁed.
Chapters focusing on the political background to the development of indirect dis-
crimination law, particularly in Europe, reveal the potential obstacles facing the con-
tinued development of equality law. For example, Havelková analyses the case law
of the European Court of Human Rights, focusing on arguments advanced by gov-
ernments and certain judges in key cases. The chapter exposes some of the latent
assumptions contained in these arguments as to the neutrality of social and legal
structures, the necessity of bias as a component of discrimination and the role of
the individual and the group within discrimination law. It highlights, perhaps unin-
tentionally, some of the assumptions that discrimination law scholarship itself often
makes, including many of the contributors to this book. It is understandable that
legal frameworks make assumptions. However, scholarship which attempts to
ground discrimination law in what disadvantage is really like in society would be
improved by directing readers towards studies that establish the facts of that disad-
vantage: for example, studies which show that certain social or legal structures are
not neutral with regards to race or gender. Havelková stresses that the recognition of
context is “the core of the doctrine of indirect discrimination” yet does not provide
an interested reader with evidence of this social context. This is not an issue unique
to the authors within this volume but is important particularly when criticising
judges for having failed to account for this social reality.
While one might consider McCrea’s chapter to be an outlier in this collection
because it deals with the particularised topic of freedom of religion and its compati-
bility with indirect discrimination law, it alerts the reader to the potential conﬂicts
which might exist between indirect discrimination law and other areas of law.
Similarly, Khaitan and Steel’s chapter examines the potential conﬂict between indir-
ect discrimination and the rule of law. These chapters hint at fruitful discussion that
is to be had concerning the interaction between discrimination law and aspects of
constitutional and human rights law, a topic which is of increasing relevance
given recent controversies over the conﬂict between rights to non-discrimination
and rights to freedom of expression and religion in the provision of services for
same-sex weddings.
It is unfortunate that at several points in the book, various writers claim that indir-
ect discrimination is concerned with harm that is done to social groups as a whole
(Collins and Khaitan, p. 19; Fredman, p. 32; McCrea, p. 156; Khaitan and Steel,
p. 201). The test for indirect discrimination does not require a claimant to prove
harm to groups as a whole. Rather, the harm of indirect discrimination is felt by
individuals. It is assessed based on the eﬀect that conduct might have on persons
who share a protected characteristic should they be subject to such treatment. It is
never the case that a claimant must prove that a provision, criterion or practice actu-
ally aﬀects the entirety of the group that those individuals belong to. The test is
designed to identify circumstances where individuals are treated worse because of
a protected characteristic, despite that treatment being facially neutral with regards
to those characteristics. As such, if an employer indirectly discriminates against his
or her female employees, all that must be proven is that the employer’s actions put
or would put female employees at a particular disadvantage relative to male employ-
ees. There is no requirement to prove that women as a group were harmed.
This collection simultaneously addresses the philosophical, doctrinal and political
foundations, of indirect discrimination law and in so doing fails to comprehensively
account for any of those types. A volume such as Philosophical Foundations of
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Discrimination Law (2013), edited by Hellman and Moreau, largely avoids this
problem by focusing solely on problems of one type. Nevertheless, this book excels
in oﬀering a snapshot into contemporary discrimination law scholarship and is a
must-read for anyone working in this area. Several of the essays are sure to shape
the contours of debates in this ﬁeld for years.
MICHAEL P. FORAN
TRINITY HALL
The Duty of Care in Negligence. By JAMES PLUNKETT. [Oxford: Hart Publishing,
2018. xxiv + 225 pp. Hardback £55. ISBN 978-15-09914-84-5.]
Few doctrines in the law of torts have received as much scholarly attention as the duty
of care in negligence. It is legitimate to ask what new contribution a treatise on duty
can make. James Plunkett’s The Duty of Care in Negligence provides a useful consoli-
dation of the historical and modern evolution of duty and a thoughtful critique of some
current scholarly debates. Those who work in the ﬁeld may ﬁnd this material to be
largely familiar: the historical terrain has already been well-charted by David
Ibbetson and others; and the journey from Donoghue v Stevenson [1932] A.C. 562
to Anns v Merton London Borough Council [1978] A.C. 728 and Caparo
Industries v Dickman [1990] 1 A.C. 605 is all too well known. Plunkett also provides
a catalogue of the various methodologies for assessing novel duty situations, and a
discussion of the appropriateness of using so-called “policy” reasoning in duty
cases. The latter debate has become, to some scholars, detached from reality.
The meat of Plunkett’s book is contained in chs. 4, 5 and 6, which assess the
respective concepts of “factual duty” and “notional duty”. Factual duty refers to
the determination “whether harm to the plaintiﬀ was a reasonably foreseeable con-
sequence of the defendant’s conduct”, while notional duty refers to the question
“whether the broad circumstances in which the plaintiﬀ suﬀered the injury ought
to be subject to the laws of negligence” (emphasis original). With respect to the
ﬁrst inquiry, Plunkett agrees with critics who ﬁnd the duty question superﬂuous
in negligence analyses, as it overlaps with the more clearly factual questions of
whether the defendant breached the standard of care and whether the loss was too
remote. All of these questions boil down to an assessment of whether the defen-
dant’s actions posed a foreseeable risk of the injury suﬀered by the plaintiﬀ.
Plunkett thus argues that the factual inquiry should be removed from duty analyses,
which should instead focus exclusively on the notional question.
After reviewing the various duty “tests” that have been employed over the last cen-
tury (and their respective ﬂaws), Plunkett proposes that the quest for a single notional
duty test be abandoned and replaced with ﬁve broad duty categories, each with its own
principles of recovery and non-recovery. For cases involving physical injury, property
damage or psychiatric harm, the principles would explain a general rule of recovery,
subject to narrow exclusionary exceptions. Conversely, for cases involving omissions
and purely economic loss, the principles would explain a general exclusionary rule,
subject to narrow inclusionary exceptions. By employing these more discrete duty cat-
egories, Plunkett argues, we would be able more clearly to identify which principles
were relevant to any given duty scenario, and avoid having to use concepts like “prox-
imity” in such a broad way as to be vague and unhelpful.
Plunkett’s proposal seems sensible, and reﬂects, to a large measure, the way that
appellate courts already approach these situations in practice. Indeed, the UK
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